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HUGO BLACK AMONG FRIENDS 
Dennis J. Hutchinson* 
HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY. By Roger K. Newman. New York: 
Pantheon. 1994. Pp. xiv, 741. $30. 
To the generation of law students born after Earl Warren re-
tired, Hugo Black, who lived from 1886-1971, is now a shadowy 
figure. But to those who came to the profession during the "moral 
epoch" of the Warren Court,1 Black was the living embodiment of 
the liberal judicial ideal. He wrote simply and passionately about 
freedom of speech and equal protection of the laws, he was 
steadfast against official oppression and petty brutality, and he took 
his bearings from the text of the Constitution - a copy was always 
tucked in his suit pocket. The image, which Black carefully crafted, 
belied an extremely complex personality whose influence on the 
Supreme Court went far beyond his own published opinions. In-
deed, Black may have been the most influential member of the 
Court for the two decades following the outbreak of World War II. 
More than any other single Justice, Black molded the agenda of 
cases that the Court heard during the period and shaped the terms 
of discourse used by the Court to decide those cases. Even further 
behind the scenes, Black tacitly influenced scholarly evaluation of 
the Court's performance: an ex-clerk would leap to Black's defense 
in print2 when he was criticized, and other allies turned debate over 
constitutional issues into a personalized comparison of the virtues 
of Black and Justice Felix Frankfurter.3 
To the public, of course, Black was solely a creature of his opin-
ions - brief, highly accessible odes to liberty, which he grounded 
in classical thought and constitutional history, and which he insis-
tently tied to the text of the Constitution. These opinions hooked 
Roger K. Newman4 as an undergraduate: "In 1967," he reports in 
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the Epilogue, entitled "Of Hugo and Me," "I was one of the young 
devouring Hugo Black's opinions. . . . What began as a curiosity 
became a frequent preoccupation and then, admittedly, an obses-
sion. The long journey started" (p. 626). The end of the journey, 
nearly three decades later, is the most detailed study of Hugo Black 
that we have ever had or are likely to have. Mr. Newman has been 
tenacious, undaunted by Black's rather petulant decision to bum all 
of his conference notes and-i:nany of the materials in his case files 
- "You don't seem to want to pay the price of fame," his friend 
Virginia Durr chided "(p. 610). The biography, needless to say, is 
authorized. Newman's Epilogue acknowledges the energetic sup-
port of the. Black family, including both of the Justice's sons and 
daughter ("she started as a 'source' and turned into a dear friend" 
(p. 631)). 
Newman does not imply that his work is designed to satisfy the 
Black family, however, and it is hard to see how it could. The most 
revealing details in the volume touch on private and sometimes em-
barrassing personal matters that shed little light on the Justice's 
views but appear intended to humanize him - if somewhat darkly. 
The resulting portrait is an even more overbearing husband and 
domineering father than appears in either the second Mrs. Black's 
published diaries5 or Hugo Black, Jr.'s deferential memoir.6 We 
learn, for example, that Sterling Black, Jr. - the Justice's grandson 
- was suspended from public high school for circulating an under-
ground newspaper shortly after the Court heard argument in Tinker 
v. Des Moines School District.1 Newman suggests that Black's "vi-
cious harangue" (p. 592) dissenting in Tinker was fueled by his dis-
appointment with both his grandson and with his son, Sterling, the 
head of the New Mexico ACLU, who planned to ch~llenge the sus-
pension in court. "If the case ever reaches the [Supreme] Court, I 
will disqualify myself not only in it but in every other case in which 
the ACLU takes any part, no matter how small.''8 The incident is 
arresting, but not as self-explanatory as Newman implies. By 1969, 
when the Court decided Tinker, Justice Black had long since pub-
licly abandoned any hint of "absolute" protection for nonverbal 
speech. He was testy about sit-ins and flag-burning, and the neces-
5. ELIZABEIH BLACK, MR. JUSTICE AND MRs. BLACK: THE MEMOIRS OF Huoo L. 
BLACK AND ELIZABETii BLACK {1986). 
6. Huoo BLACK, JR., MY FAnmR: A REMEMBRANCE {1975). 
7. 393 U.S. 593 {1969). 
8. Pp. 592-93. It is not clear whether Black's statement came in a Jetter or in a telegram, 
nor is it clear when Sterling Black received it The footnote and source-citing apparatus in 
Newman's book is confusing. Footnote signals appear to drop randomly, and the notes col-
lect abbreviated cites that may span several paragraphs. Too often, specific quotations or 
facts lack a specific source. The author is conscious of the problem (p. 634), but his cure is 
unsuccessful. 
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sity for public order became a frequent theme. At the same time, 
the Justice never hesitated to give imperative advice to his children 
or to his wives - his first wife died in 1952 - often in fiercely 
uncompromising terms. "Vicious harangues" on a range of topics 
came frequently at this point fu the Justice's life. 
Newman's a~ount of Tinker fails to pull Black into sharp focus, 
but more importantly, it ignores other work that helps to explain 
the tenor of Black's famous dissenting opinion. Laura Kalman's 
authorized biography of Justice Abe Fortas reports: 
By the 1968 term one of Warren's clerks considered the tension be-
tween Black and Fortas "one of the most basic animosities on the 
Court." Ip. every case Fortas cared about - In re Gault, Powell v. 
Texas, Time v. Hill, Snyder v. Harris, Epperson v. Arkansas, Tinker v. 
Des Moines School District - Black was on the other side .... Black 
long had contended that the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporated the constitutional guarantees of the first 
ten amendments and applied them to the states. It followed that he 
would disagree with Fortas, who did not believe in full "incorpora-
tion" and who argued that courts properly could interpret due process 
as a broad guarantee of fairness. 
The feud between the two men also became personal, and one of 
their brethren said, "I blame that on Black."9 
Mr. Newman notes before his discussion of Tinker that the "ten-
sion" between Black and Fortas "was the only source of true fric-
tion on the Court" at the time (p. 590), but he neglects to mention 
that Fortas was the author of Tinker or that the flare-up with Black 
was only the culmination of a series of pointed, and increasingly 
sarcastic, exchanges between the two that had largely remained 
within the Court until Tinker. 
Perhaps the problem is that Mr. Newman's long-simmering stew 
has too many ingredients in the pot. Newman reports in his Epi-
logue that he did research in thirty-three states at more than one 
hundred institutions and conducted more than one thousand inter-
views (pp. 640-42). As the Tinker episode illustrates, however, the 
enormous archive of data does not necessarily always come to-
gether to create an illuminating context or to provide a persuasive 
explanation of Black's motivations or objectives. The wisdom of 
Justice Black's convictions is self-evident, at least in his opinions 
before his last few years on the Court, of which Mr. Newman reluc-
tantly concedes that "Black's Constitution 'had become all anchor 
and no sail, all umbra and no penumbra. As he aged and his ten-
dons shrank, so did the joints in his Constitution lose their elastic-
ity" (p. 594). 
9. LAURA KALMAN, ABE FoRTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 321 (1990) (footnotes omitted); 
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Justice Black's retreat from an expansive application of the Bill 
of Rights - at least of the First and Fifth Amendments - poses 
only one of the paradoxical puzzles of his thirty-four plus years on 
the bench. In an unsparing essay that deserves more attention than 
it is likely to receive, Michael Klarman declares: · 
Black, who had joined the Ku Klux Klan in 1923 to enhance both his 
budding political career and his credibility as a litigator performing 
before Klan-dominated Alabama juries, developed a reputation as 
one of history's great defenders of minority rights. Black, the Bible 
Belt Baptist, authored most of the Court's strict church/state separa-
tion opinions of the post-war era. And Black, a hero (along with 
Douglas) to millions of mid-century political liberals, compiled a vot-
ing record during his last half dozen years that can only be described 
as reactionary - dissenting, sometimes alone, in cases such as Gris-
wold, Harper, Katz, Witherspoon, Hunter v. Erickson, Sniadach, 
Tinker, Goldberg, Winship, Boddie and Cohen v. California (and seri-
ously contemplating doing so in Swann).10 
Mr. Newman casts little light on these problems. Everson v. Board 
of Education11 and McCollum v. Board of Education12 - the wa-
tershed church and state cases - are dispatched in five pages, 
largely with quotes from others. The late cases, beginning with 
Griswold, tend to get short shift, if any, perhaps because they col-
lectively belong to the "anchor" period of Black's constitutional 
thought. 
The presentation of Black's Klan membership is the most unsat-
isfying treatment in the book, though it is not clear whether Black 
or Newman is more at fault. The basic facts of his involvement are 
now well-known. Black joined the Klan in 1923. Fearing unfavora-
ble publicity in the future, he executed a letter of resignation in July 
of 1925, which he left on file with local Klan officials. He then pro-
ceeded to campaign for the U.S. Senate as the Klan's implicit candi-
date in the 1926 election. After a decade in the Senate, where 
Black fought aggressively for the New Deal in general and for or-
ganized labor in particular, President Franklin D. Roosevelt named 
Black in 1937 to fill the first Supreme Court vacancy in Roosevelt's 
administration. Following Black's confirmation, a newspaper re-
porter broke the Klan story - complete with photostatic copies of 
relevant documents - and a political firestorm erupted. President 
Roosevelt was acutely embarrassed, and Black was under pressure 
to resign from the Court even before he formally took his seat. The 
storm subsided only after Black made an eleven-minute national 
radio broadcast, heard by the second largest audience in history; 
Edward VIII's abdication speech the previous year was first. 
10. Michael Klarman, Book Review, 12 L. & His. REv. 399, 401 (1994). 
11. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
12. 333 U.S. 203 {1948). 
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Black's brief statement made two points: that he had been a mem-
ber of the Klan for a short time, but, at greater length, that he vig-
orously opposed bigotry in all forms. He took his seat on the 
Supreme Court three days later. 
Newman devotes an entire chapter, almost twelve pages, to the 
Klan question. From 1937 on, Black was highly defensive about his 
prior Klan membership. Newman recounts nearly a dozen explana-
tions from the Justice about why he joined in the first place - most 
of which Black provided privately to friends and staff over a period 
of thirty years. Some of the excuses contradict each other, and the 
cumulative effect has the ring of special pleading. He was a joiner, 
and the Klan was simply one more fraternal order (p. 99); or, the 
Klan was so powerful socially and politically in Birmingham that he 
could not afford not to join (pp. 96-97); he never gave a dime to the 
Klan; or he paid ten dollars so that a Klan recruiter would stop 
pestering him (p. 96). He provided the least plausible excuse to a 
friend during his first month on the Court: "When I joined the 
Klan, it was not anti-Catholic or anti-Jewish. With other progres-
sive Democrats, I went in to prevent it from falling into the hands 
of machine politicians. We succeeded and I quit when I saw the 
Klan was going in the wrong direction" (p. 98). Twenty years later, 
he told a group of law clerks, "if you wanted to be elected to the 
Senate in Alabama in the 1920s, you'd join the Klan too" (p. 100). 
The nagging question is not what Black's motivations in fact 
were in 1923, but what effect a lifetime of guilt had on his judicial 
career. Newman never accuses Black of calculation, but he strongly 
implies that early in Black's career the Justice inflated his rhetoric 
in opinions condemning racial discrimination for instrumental rea-
sons that included enhancing his own standing within and without 
the Court. During his first two years on the Court, by Newman's 
account, Black worked fourteen hours a day with only modest re-
sults. His early opinions often sounded like Senate speeches, and 
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone indiscreetly criticized Black's work to 
the columnist Marquis Childs, who promptly reported Stone's com-
plaint. Stone even wrote Felix Frankfurter at Harvard Law School 
and suggested that he surreptitiously tutor Black (p. 275). To New-
man, Chambers v. Florida, 13 in October Term 1939, provided Black 
with the opportunity to prove himself to his colleagues and to expi-
ate his youthful fraternal sins. Black wrote a forceful opinion for 
the Court in Chambers invalidating the criminal convictions of 
young black defendants who had been subjected to the third de-
gree. "Any doubts about Black's commitment to the Constitution 
and civil liberties," writes Newman, "were quickly stilled. Com-
13. 309 U.S. 227 (1940). 
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mentators heaped praise on him; to his supporters it was vindica-
tion" (p. 283). 
Black's vindication was compromised four years later. For the 
consummate liberal, Korematsu v. United States14 is as inexplicable 
as it is disgraceful. Writing for a six-man majority, Black sustained 
the constitutionality of the compulsory removal of one hundred and 
twenty thousand residents of Japanese descent - including seventy 
thousand citizens and fifty thousand aliens - from the West Coast 
during World War II. Black justified the military order on the 
ground of practical exigencies: 1'Pressing public necessity may 
sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antago-
nism never can."15 Eugene Rostow condemned the decision in The 
Yale Law Journal,16 and it quickly became the Dred Scott of its day. 
The question about Korematsu is why Black felt he had to justify 
the executive order, especially on constitutional grounds. The point 
is far from hypothetical. Until the last minute, Justice Douglas was 
prepared to dissent and had circulated an opinion dissenting on 
statutory rather than constitutional grounds. The split among the 
Justices was thus 5-4, with Black holding the decisive vote. One 
wonders, though Newman does not ask, why Black did not adopt 
Douglas's position. The wartime necessity justification was no 
longer relevant; two weeks after the court announced its decision, 
the Army canceled the total exclusion order. Was Black reluctant 
to second-guess judicially the ailing President whom he had embar-
rassed at the time of his appointment? Was he even more unwilling 
to condemn constitutionally General John L. De Witt, who issued 
the exclusion order and who was an old Alabama friend (indeed, 
the man with whom Black briefly stayed when he was elected to the 
Senate in 1926)? Newman reports that Korematsu "troubled Black 
for the rest of his life" (p. 318), but not enough for him to recant his 
role - unlike Earl Warren, who supported exclusion as Attorney 
General of California but who declared it "wrong" in his 
Memoirs.17 Justice Black was unrepentant to an interviewer in 
1967: 
I would do precisely the same thing today, in any part of the country. 
I would probably issue the same order were I President. We had a 
situation where we were at war. People were rightly fearful of the 
Japanese in Los Angeles, many loyal to the United States, many un-
doubtedly not, having dual citizenship - lots of them. They all look 
alike to a person not a Jap. [p. 318] 
14. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See ROGER DANIELS, THE DECISION TO RELOCATE THE JAPA-
NESE AMERICANS (1975); PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983). 
15. 323 U.S. at 216. 
16. Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases - A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 
(1945). 
17. EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN 149 (1977). 
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The sentiment chillingly echoes General De Witt's testimony to a 
congressional committee more than twenty-five years before, which 
Newman quotes: "A Jap's a Jap. It makes no difference whether 
he's an American citizen or not. There is no way to determine their 
loyalty" (p. 313). Black's identification with General De Witt's 
"plight" suggests that the Justice always saw the case from the per-
spective of the policymaker on the scene and not from the perspec-
tive the judge faced with creating constitutional, or at least 
statutory, precedent. Black made a career of condemning judges 
who used the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to substitute their policy judgments for those of legis-
lators and administrators. Korematsu stands as a lesson learned too 
well. 
If Korematsu was the personal low point of Black's judicial ca-
reer, Adamson v. Califomia1s was the high point. Black's dissent in 
Adamson argued that the Due Process Clause of section one of the 
Fourteenth Amendment "incorporated" the protections of the first 
eight Amendments against the actions of the states. It was his 
"most important" opinion, Black told Newman, "no question about 
it" (p. 352). Newman adds little to previous accounts of the sub-
stance of the Adamson debate. He concedes that "Black's was an 
advocate's history: he proved too much and ignored or ·swept away 
all doubtful evidence" (p. 354). And, once more, we hear about 
Black's thin skin: he suspected Frankfurter-of instigating Charles 
Fairman's forceful critique in the Stanford Law Review19 in return 
for Fairman "get[ ting] a job at Harvard" (pp. 356-57). Black even 
considered, but abandoned, having his.law clerk, Louis Oberdorfer, 
write a rebuttal to Fairman (p. 357). "Like the snake that kept ris-
ing up, Fairman's article was always on Black's mind," Newman 
says. "He had no doubt he was right historically" (p. 359). In any 
event, Black was deeply invested in his position. He had staked his 
intellectual reputation on the opinion, and his entire judicial strat-
egy depended on developing a formula for restricting judicial dis-
cretion in the interpretation of the Due Process Clauses while 
nonetheless reaching what he viewed as liberal results. Or as he 
told an interviewer in 1967: "If I didn't find that this was [the sec-
tion one drafters'] view, my career on the Court would have been 
entirely different. I would not have gone with due process and I'd 
be considered the most reactionary judge on the Court" (p. 353) -
evidently an unacceptable consequence. 
Or at least it was until 1964. Newman explains Black's drift to 
"the other side from those liberals" (p. 543 quoting Black) as a 
18. 332 U.S. 46 {1947). 
19. Charles Fainnan, Does the 14th Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Orig· 
inal Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949). 
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function of events overtaking the man. The critical case, according 
to Newman, was Bell v. Maryland,20 involving sit-ins: 
Formerly [Black] had treated dissenters as heroes indispensable to 
progress, who helped the country live up to its highest aspirations. 
Now he disparaged protest groups and their leaders: he considered 
them ambitious, misinformed, dangerous agitators. A very different 
Black was focusing on constitutional limitations of a very different 
sort. [p. 551] 
Newman mentions in passing two other factors that influenced 
Black, but they require more emphasis. First, the Court had 
changed, and for the first time in two decades, Black was no longer 
its philosophical leader. Warren, Douglas, Brennan, and Goldberg, 
later replaced by Fortas, did not share Black's anxieties about using 
the Due Process Clauses expansively. Personally, Black was alien-
ated from the liberal wing of the Court. Douglas, always more an 
ally than a friend, had fallen from grace in Black's eyes due to his 
colorful personal life. Goldberg and Fortas were unshaken by 
Black's growing peevishness, which seems to have made Black dig 
into his new positions even more deeply. Second, street protest of-
fended Black's sense of order, particularly as it exploded bloodily in 
the South. To protect the protester was to sanction violence, which 
Black found incongruent with the Constitution. Black had been re-
viled in many parts of Alabama for supporting the desegregation 
decisions in 1954 and 1955, and his reputational wounds from that 
period ·were finally healing. Constitutionalizing sit-ins threatened 
the rapprochement. Newman quotes remarks from Warren that 
ring true, even if they reflect no credit on either Justice: "Hugo just 
wants to be buried in Alabama" (p. 551). 
Still, Hugo Black had one "grand finale" (p. 613) in him-New 
York Times v. United States,21 the Pentagon Papers Case - which 
he thought was "the most important First Amendment opinion of 
his career" (p. 617). Newman tries to crank up a dramatic climax to 
square with Black's estimation of his swan song, but neither the 
political nor the doctrinal stakes seem to match the Justice's pride 
of authorship. Nonetheless, Newman concludes: "The nation sur-
vived the publication of the Pentagon papers; indeed it became 
stronger as a result. Without such cases and without judges willing 
to affirm the commands of the First Amendment, the sounds of 
hobnailed boots might well be heard marching in the night" (p. 619; 
footnote omitted). 
The Pentagon Papers episode provides a monumental conclu-
sion to what Newman designed as a monumental book. The monu-
ment commemorates Black's civil rights jurisprudence, especially 
20. 378 U.S. 226 {1964). 
21. 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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his opinions on the First Amendment, rather than his entire judicial 
career. Perhaps six hundred richly detailed pages of text is enough. 
Black, however, was more than the Bill of Rights and the Four-
teenth Amendment. He had a reputation within the Court as a 
master tactician who worked well with very different people and 
who used his forensic and temperamental skills to great advantage. 
Newman quotes Justice Harry Blackmun as recalling that even in 
his eighties, Black was a "canny, lovable manipulator ... ever the 
politician, ever the Senator still" (p. 601). Newman never shows us 
examples ·of those talents in action, which is a shame. Newman's 
substantive omissions are even more unsatisfactory. He barely 
touches on Black's judicial view of the Commerce Clause, a critical 
issue during the New Deal, and he provides only one paragraph on 
the civil jury - one of Black's great passions.22 Newman totally 
neglects Black's important writings on antitrust law,23 federal juris-
diction and abstention,24 and labor law.25 The final omission is the 
least understandable. Black's political career in Alabama was 
rooted in the labor movement, and his crowning achievement in the 
Senate was federal minimum-wage legislation. His judicial opinions 
never shirked from protecting the rights of labor, statutory or con-
stitutional.26 Notwithstanding the gaps in coverage, and they are 
far from trivial, Hugo Black has been fortunate in his chosen biog-
rapher. Mr. Newman is sympathetic, to say the least: Black's ene-
mies are his enemies, and Black's friends, often literally, are his 
friends. Author and subject were obviously comfortable with each 
other. The resulting volume may include a few unattractive vi-
gnettes but nothing that would threaten friendship. 
22. See, e.g., Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 
359 U.S. 500 {1959). 
23. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270 {1966); Eastern R.R. Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Co., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale 
Stores, 359 U.S. 207 {1959); Tunken Roller Bearing v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); 
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); AP v. United States, 326 
U.S. 1 {1945). 
24. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 
{1971). ' 
25. See generally Ivan C. Rutledge, Justice Black and Labor Law, 14 UCLA L. REv. 501 
{1967). When Justice Frankfurter mounted a campaign against review of pro-employer judg-
ments under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA), Black led the successful counter-
attack. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Felix Frankfurter and the Business of the Supreme Court, 
0.T. 1946-0.T. 1961, 1980 SuP. Cr. REv. 143, 155. 
26. See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice, 336 U.S. 490 {1949); Milk Wagon Drivers' 
Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 299 {1941) {Black, J., dissenting); Milk Wagon 
Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Co., 311 U.S. 91 (1940). 
